# An Intransitivity Model for Matchup and Pairwise Comparison

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An intuitive example a rock-paper-scissors game, the pairwise matchup result is judged by three rules: { $paper \succ rock, rock \succ scissors$  and  $scissors \succ paper$ }. A transitive model results in a transitive dominance paper  $\succ$  scissors, that violates the third rule  $scissors \succ paper$ .

**Examples** sports tournaments; online games; election process.

## **Related works**

## Problem setting

- Candidate players i and  $i \in \mathbf{P}$  with  $|\mathbf{P}| = N$ . • 4-tuples  $(i, j, n_i, n_j)$ , and  $i \succ j := (i, j, 1, 0)$ . • Matchup matrix  $\mathbf{M} \in \mathcal{R}^{N \times N}$ .
- $M_{ij} > 0$  means item *i* has a comparative advantage over item *j*.
- 1. Bradley-Terry Model (Bradley et al., 1952)

$$\Pr(i \succ j) = \frac{\exp(\gamma_i)}{\exp(\gamma_i) + \exp(\gamma_j)} = \frac{1}{1 + \exp(-M_{ij})},$$

where  $\gamma_i$  is the ability of winning for player *i*.

$$M_{ij} = \gamma_i - \gamma_j.$$

Figure: An illustration of the proposed generalized intransitivity framework

## Properties

- 1.  $\mathbf{Y} \mathbf{Y}^{\top}$  can represent an arbitrarily complex matchup matrix by removing the rank constraint.
- 2. It is equivalent to the BT model when  $rank(\mathbf{Y}) = 0$ .
- 3. It can represent the intransitivity when  $rank(\mathbf{Y}) = 1$ :
  - $\mathbf{Y} = (x_1^{\text{blade}}, x_2^{\text{blade}}, \dots, x_N^{\text{blade}})^{\top} (x_1^{\text{chest}}, x_2^{\text{chest}}, \dots, x_N^{\text{chest}}),$
  - the matchup matrix without the strength terms becomes

 $M_{ij} = x_i^{\text{blade}} x_j^{\text{chest}} - x_i^{\text{chest}} x_j^{\text{blade}}.$ 

Assume that  $i \succ j$  and  $j \succ k$  (i.e.,  $M_{ij} > 0$  and  $M_{jk} > 0$ ), then taking  $x_i^{\text{chest}} > 0, x_i^{\text{chest}} < 0, \text{ and } x_k^{\text{chest}} > 0 \text{ shows } k \succ i \text{ (i.e., } M_{ik} < 0 \text{).}$ 

## **Datasets and Experiments**

• Intrans.: whether the dataset contains intransitivity

2. Blade-Chest-Inner Model (Chen et al., 2016a)

$$M_{ij} = \mathbf{x}_i^{\text{blade}^{\top}} \mathbf{x}_j^{\text{chest}} - \mathbf{x}_j^{\text{blade}^{\top}} \mathbf{x}_i^{\text{chest}} + \gamma_i - \gamma_j, \qquad (2)$$

**3. Neural network framework of Blade-Chest** (Chen et al., 2016b) Top layer is the blade-chest-inner model (2):

 $\Pr(i \succ j | g) = \sigma(M(i, j | g)).$ 

4. Blade-Chest-Sigma Model (Duan et al., 2017)

$$M_{ij} = \mathbf{x}_i^{\mathsf{T}} \Sigma \mathbf{x}_j + \mathbf{x}_i^{\mathsf{T}} \Gamma \mathbf{x}_i - \mathbf{x}_j^{\mathsf{T}} \Gamma \mathbf{x}_j,$$

where  $\Sigma, \Gamma \in \mathcal{R}^{d \times d}$  are the transitive matrices.

## Proposed method

- A generalized model with more expressiveness by a low-rank matrix.
- Neural Network framework of the generalized model.
- A quantitative evaluation of the existence of intransitivity in datasets.

### Matchup function

• **No.IntPlayer**: the fraction of players invovled in rock-paper-scissors • Int.Ratio: the amount of the rock-paper-scissors-like relationship (%)

Table: Summary of the real-world datasets

Dataset	Players	Records	Intrans.	No.IntPlayer	Int.Ratio
SushiA	10	100000	no	0	0
SushiB	100	25000	yes	92	26.87%
MovieLens100K	1682	139982	yes	1130	0.19%
Election A5	16	44298	yes	6	0.44%
Election A9	12	95888	yes	5	1.82%
Election A17	13	21037	yes	8	8.18%
Election A48	10	25848	no	0	0
Election A81	11	44298	yes	5	2.50%
SF4-5000	35	5000	yes	34	23.86%
Dota	757	10442	yes	550	97.58%
Pokemon	800	50000	yes	784	78.58%

#### How does the proposed method perform?

Table: Test accuracy on the real-world datasets

Dataset	Bradley-Terry	Blade-Chest-Inner	Blade-Chest-Sigma	Neural BC	Proposed model
SushiA	$0.6525 \pm 0.0011$	$0.6546 \pm 0.0006$	$0.6560 \pm 0.0004$	$0.6630 \pm 0.0004$	$0.6632\pm0.0003$
SushiB	$0.6257 \pm 0.0025$	$0.6235 \pm 0.0150$	$0.6414 \pm 0.0019$	$0.6561 \pm 0.0017$	$0.6563\pm0.0011$
MovieLens100K	$0.6785 \pm 0.0005$	$0.6792 \pm 0.0004$	$0.6789 \pm 0.0003$	$0.6950 \pm 0.0019$	$0.6973\pm0.0002$
Election A5	$0.6478 \pm 0.0017$	$0.6489 \pm 0.0011$	$0.6494 \pm 0.0018$	$0.6550 \pm 0.0030$	$0.6560\pm0.0018$
Election A9	$0.6028 \pm 0.0003$	$0.6096 \pm 0.0007$	$0.6047 \pm 0.0008$	$0.6174 \pm 0.0003$	$0.6175\pm0.0003$
Election A17	$0.5189 \pm 0.0001$	$0.5305 \pm 0.0010$	$0.5296 \pm 0.0013$	$0.5582 \pm 0.0003$	$0.5598 \pm 0.0002$
Election A48	$0.5993 \pm 0.0001$	$0.6001 \pm 0.0001$	$0.5996 \pm 0.0001$	$0.6060 \pm 0.0001$	$0.6056\pm0.0001$
Election A81	$0.6013 \pm 0.0001$	$0.6018 \pm 0.0001$	$0.6011 \pm 0.0002$	$0.6194 \pm 0.0001$	$0.6194\pm0.0001$
SF4-5000	$0.5079 \pm 0.0078$	$0.5181 \pm 0.0171$	$0.5358 \pm 0.0049$	$0.5514 \pm 0.0008$	$0.5496\pm0.0021$
DotA	$0.6334 \pm 0.0077$	$0.6432 \pm 0.0034$	$0.6420 \pm 0.0051$	$0.6468 \pm 0.0031$	$0.6485\pm0.0025$
Pokemon	$0.8157 \pm 0.0094$	$0.8495 \pm 0.0016$	$0.8187 \pm 0.0168$	$0.8943 \pm 0.0040$	$\boldsymbol{0.8949\pm0.0021}$

Define the representation matrix as

 $\mathbf{X}^{\text{blade}} = (\mathbf{x}_1^{\text{blade}}, \dots, \mathbf{x}_N^{\text{blade}}), \quad \mathbf{X}^{\text{chest}} = (\mathbf{x}_1^{\text{chest}}, \dots, \mathbf{x}_N^{\text{chest}}), \quad \boldsymbol{\gamma} = (\gamma_1, \gamma_2, \dots, \gamma_N).$ (2)  $\Rightarrow$   $\mathbf{M} = \mathbf{X}^{\text{blade}^{\top}} \mathbf{X}^{\text{chest}} - \mathbf{X}^{\text{chest}^{\top}} \mathbf{X}^{\text{blade}} + \boldsymbol{\gamma}^{\top} \mathbf{1} - \mathbf{1}^{\top} \boldsymbol{\gamma}.$ Replace the matrix product  $\mathbf{X}^{\text{blade}^{\top}} \mathbf{X}^{\text{chest}}$  by a new matrix  $\mathbf{Y}$  as  $\mathbf{Y} = \mathbf{X}^{\text{blade}^{\dagger}} \mathbf{X}^{\text{chest}}.$ 

which results in a general representation of the matchup matrix as  $\mathbf{M} =$ 

$$= (\boldsymbol{\gamma}^{\top} \mathbf{1} - \mathbf{1}^{\top} \boldsymbol{\gamma}) + (\mathbf{Y} - \mathbf{Y}^{\top}) \text{ s.t. } \operatorname{rank}(\mathbf{Y}) \leq D.$$

**Objection** (assuming i is the winner; same with MSE loss)

 $\Theta \Sigma_{(i,j)} \log \Pr(i \succ j | \Theta).$ 

**Top layer** the generalized intransitivity model (4):

 $\Pr(i \succ j) = \sigma(M_{ij}) = \sigma(Y_{ij} - Y_{ji}).$ 

#### References

Bradley et al., 1952, Ran analysis of incomplete block designs: I. the method of paired comparisons. Chen et al., 2016a, Modeling intransitivity in matchup and comparison data. Chen et al., 2016b, Predicting matchups and preferences in context. Duan et al., 2017, A Generalized Model for Multidimensional Intransitivity.