

# Cancelable Biometrics Vault: A Secure Key-Binding Biometric Cryptosystem based on Chaffing and Winnowing

Osama Ouda<sup>a</sup>, Karthik Nandakumar<sup>b</sup>, Arun Ross<sup>c</sup>

<sup>a</sup>Department of Computer Science, Jouf University, Saudi Arabia

<sup>b</sup>Computer Vision Department, Mohamad Bin Zayed University of Artificial Intelligence, Abu Dhabi, UAE

<sup>c</sup>Department of Computer Science and Engineering, Michigan State University



## ABSTRACT


- A novel biometric cryptosystem framework, referred to as **Cancelable Biometric Vault (CBV)**, is proposed.
- The CBV framework benefits from the **cancelable biometrics (CB) construct** and the concept of **chaffing and winnowing** to address the limitations of existing biometric cryptosystems.
- To demonstrate the usefulness of the CBV, we implement the framework using the **BioEncoding CB scheme**.
- Experiments show that the decoding accuracy of the proposed CBV framework is comparable to the recognition accuracy of BioEncoding scheme, **regardless of the cryptographic key size**.

## PROPOSED CBV FRAMEWORK

### Key Encoding

**Algorithm 1** Key-binding procedure of the proposed CBV framework.  
**INPUT:** True template  $x^t$ , fake template  $x^f$ ,  $l$ -bit random cryptographic key  $k$ , and a set of  $l$  cancelable transforms  $\{C_i\}_{i=1}^l$ .  
**OUTPUT:** Biometric key  $n_{kbb}$ ,  $Hash(n)$ .


1. Compute the hash value  $Hash(n)$  of the input key  $n$ .
2. for all bits  $n_i$  in  $n$  do
3. if  $n_i = 1$  then
4.  $n_{kbb}(i) \leftarrow C_i(x^t)$
5. else
6.  $n_{kbb}(i) \leftarrow C_i(x^f)$
7. end if
8. end for




### Key Decoding

**Algorithm 2** Key-release procedure of the proposed CBV framework.  
**INPUT:** Biometric key  $n_{kbb}$ , releasing template  $x^t$ ,  $Hash(n)$ , similarity threshold  $\tau$ , and the same set of  $l$  cancelable transforms  $\{C_i\}_{i=1}^l$  used in Algorithm 1.  
**OUTPUT:** Released key  $n$  or Failure

1. Generate  $l$  cancelable templates from  $x^t$  using the transforms  $\{C_i\}_{i=1}^l$  employed at key-binding.
2. for all cancelable templates in  $n_{kbb}$  do
3. if  $Sim(n_{kbb}(i), C_i(x^t)) > \tau$  then
4.  $n'_i \leftarrow 1$
5. else
6.  $n'_i \leftarrow 0$
7. end if
8. end for
9. Compute the hash value  $Hash(n')$  of the recovered key  $n'$  using the same hashing function employed at binding.
10. if  $Hash(n') = Hash(n)$  then
11. Release the key
12. else
13. return Failure
14. end if





### Extended BioEncoding



- An **extended BioEncoding CB scheme** is used to demonstrate the usefulness of the CBV framework.
- The main idea behind this scheme is to divide the binary template (the iris-code) into words of **different lengths** and map each word to a single bit based on a **non-invertible Boolean function** such as the **XOR** or **XNOR** functions.

## RESULTS



- CASIA-V3-Interval** iris image database
- 2639** images, **396** classes
- Open-Source Code by **Libor Masek**
- A **generic mask** is used to preserve users' privacy

- Decoding accuracy of **CBV** is **comparable** to the recognition accuracy of the **extended BioEncoding scheme**.
- Decoding accuracy is **not affected** by **increasing the key length**.

	FRR(%)	FAR(%)
Iris-codes (mask)	4.72	0.001
Iris-codes (generic mask)	5.65	0.001
BioCodes	6.89	0.001
Proposed Method ( $ \kappa  = 16$ )	6.92	0.001
Proposed Method ( $ \kappa  = 32$ )	6.92	0.001
Proposed Method ( $ \kappa  = 64$ )	6.92	0.001
Proposed Method ( $ \kappa  = 128$ )	6.92	0.001
Proposed Method ( $ \kappa  = 256$ )	6.92	0.001

## CONCLUSIONS

- Unlike existing systems, the proposed CBV framework **does not employ error correcting codes** and thereby it **deal with the trade-off between the key-size and decoding accuracy**.
- Moreover, the CBV **does not rely on a specific representation** of biometric data.
- The proposed framework, however, **assumes the availability of suitable CB schemes** so that it can be applied to different biometric modalities.
- Also, the CBV framework requires the **repeated application of the utilized CB scheme** (proportional to the key size).

## INTRODUCTION

- Biometric cryptosystems** are utilized to protect both **cryptographic keys** and **biometrics data**.
- Existing techniques such as Fuzzy Commitment and and Fuzzy Vault schemes employ **Error Correcting Codes (ECCs)** in order to deal with **intra-user variations** inherent to biometric data.
- This introduces a **trade-off** between the **key length** and **matching accuracy**.
- Moreover, these techniques are **vulnerable to privacy leakage** since it is it is trivial to recover the original biometric data given the biometric key and its associated cryptographic key.
- In order to address the above two limitations, **novel key-binding biometric cryptosystem** that does not utilize ECCs is proposed.