

Cancelable Biometrics Vault: A Secure Key-Binding Biometric Cryptosystem based on Chaffing and Winnowing

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ABSTRACT


- A novel biometric cryptosystem framework, referred to as **Cancelable Biometric Vault (CBV)**, is proposed.
- The CBV framework benefits from the **cancelable biometrics (CB) construct** and the concept of **chaffing and winnowing** to address the limitations of existing biometric cryptosystems.
- To demonstrate the usefulness of the CBV, we implement the framework using the **BioEncoding CB scheme**.
- Experiments show that the decoding accuracy of the proposed CBV framework is comparable to the recognition accuracy of BioEncoding scheme, **regardless of the cryptographic key size**.

PROPOSED CBV FRAMEWORK

Key Encoding

Algorithm 1 Key-binding procedure of the proposed CBV framework.
INPUT: True template x^t , fake template x^f , l -bit random cryptographic key k , and a set of l cancelable transforms $\{C_i\}_{i=1}^l$.
OUTPUT: Biometric key n_{kbb} , $Hash(n)$.


1. Compute the hash value $Hash(n)$ of the input key n .
2. for all bits n_i in n do
3. if $n_i = 1$ then
4. $n_{kbb}(i) \leftarrow C_i(x^t)$
5. else
6. $n_{kbb}(i) \leftarrow C_i(x^f)$
7. end if
8. end for




Key Decoding

Algorithm 2 Key-release procedure of the proposed CBV framework.
INPUT: Biometric key n_{kbb} , releasing template x^r , $Hash(n)$, similarity threshold τ , and the same set of l cancelable transforms $\{C_i\}_{i=1}^l$ used in Algorithm 1.
OUTPUT: Released key n or Failure

1. Generate l cancelable templates from x^r using the transforms $\{C_i\}_{i=1}^l$ employed at key-binding.
2. for all cancelable templates in n_{kbb} do
3. if $Sim(n_{kbb}(i), C_i(x^r)) > \tau$ then
4. $n'_i \leftarrow 1$
5. else
6. $n'_i \leftarrow 0$
7. end if
8. end for
9. Compute the hash value $Hash(n')$ of the recovered key n' using the same hashing function employed at binding.
10. if $Hash(n') = Hash(n)$ then
11. Release the key
12. else
13. return Failure
14. end if





Extended BioEncoding



- An **extended BioEncoding CB scheme** is used to demonstrate the usefulness of the CBV framework.
- The main idea behind this scheme is to divide the binary template (the iris-code) into words of **different lengths** and map each word to a single bit based on a **non-invertible Boolean function** such as the **XOR** or **XNOR** functions.

RESULTS



- Decoding accuracy of **CBV is comparable** to the recognition accuracy of the **extended BioEncoding scheme**.
- Decoding accuracy is **not affected** by **increasing the key length**.

	FRR(%)	FAR(%)
Iris-codes (mask)	4.72	0.001
Iris-codes (generic mask)	5.65	0.001
BioCodes	6.89	0.001
Proposed Method ($ \kappa = 16$)	6.92	0.001
Proposed Method ($ \kappa = 32$)	6.92	0.001
Proposed Method ($ \kappa = 64$)	6.92	0.001
Proposed Method ($ \kappa = 128$)	6.92	0.001
Proposed Method ($ \kappa = 256$)	6.92	0.001

CONCLUSIONS

- Unlike existing systems, the proposed CBV framework **does not employ error correcting codes** and thereby it **deal with the trade-off between the key-size and decoding accuracy**.
- Moreover, the CBV **does not rely on a specific representation** of biometric data.
- The proposed framework, however, **assumes the availability of suitable CB schemes** so that it can be applied to different biometric modalities.
- Also, the CBV framework requires the **repeated application of the utilized CB scheme** (proportional to the key size).

INTRODUCTION

- Biometric cryptosystems** are utilized to protect both **cryptographic keys** and **biometrics data**.
- Existing techniques such as Fuzzy Commitment and and Fuzzy Vault schemes employ **Error Correcting Codes (ECCs)** in order to deal with **intra-user variations** inherent to biometric data.
- This introduces a **trade-off** between the **key length** and **matching accuracy**.
- Moreover, these techniques are **vulnerable to privacy leakage** since it is it is trivial to recover the original biometric data given the biometric key and its associated cryptographic key.
- In order to address the above two limitations, **novel key-binding biometric cryptosystem** that does not utilize ECCs is proposed.