



Task-based Focal Loss for Adversarially Robust Meta-Learning

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Background

❖ Adversarial attack:

- ❖ a technique that attempts to fool models by supplying deceptive input
- ❖ white-box attack: maximize loss on perturbed example with perturbation restriction

❖ Adversarial robustness:


- ❖ evaluate the ability of defending against an adversary who will attack the model

❖ Problem of robust (few-shot) meta-learner:

- ❖ meta-learners designed to learn with less training data, are easier to attack
- ❖ Edmunds et al., revealed that simple attack can disturb MAML with success rate over 80%

❖ Our focus:

- ❖ select MAML as a typical meta-learner
- ❖ improve adversarial robustness of MAML



Few-shot Meta-learner

Regular Model

Related Work

❖ Meta-learning:

- ❖ Model-Agnostic Meta-Learning(MAML)
- ❖ Bayesian Model-Agnostic Meta-Learning
- ❖ Hierarchically Structured Meta-learning(HSML)
- ❖ many models are derived from MAML

❖ Adversarial attacks:

- ❖ FGSM: Fast Gradient Sign Method $x_a = x + \epsilon \text{sign}(\nabla_x \mathcal{L}(x, y))$.
- ❖ PGD: improved version, iteratively generates perturbation & conduct projection
- ❖ C&W attack: optimization-based attack $\min_{x_a} \|x - x_a\|_p - c\mathcal{L}(x_a, y)$.

❖ Robust meta-learner:

- ❖ ADML: perturb both support and query data, make the inner gradient update and the meta-update arm-wrestle with each other
- ❖ Adversarial Querying: only perturb query data, more efficient and more robust

Algorithm 1 Model-Agnostic Meta-Learning

Require: $p(\mathcal{T})$: distribution over tasks

Require: α, β : step size hyperparameters

```
1: randomly initialize  $\theta$ 
2: while not done do
3:   Sample batch of tasks  $\mathcal{T}_i \sim p(\mathcal{T})$ 
4:   for all  $\mathcal{T}_i$  do
5:     Evaluate  $\nabla_{\theta} \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{T}_i}(f_{\theta})$  with respect to  $K$  examples
6:     Compute adapted parameters with gradient descent:  $\theta'_i = \theta - \alpha \nabla_{\theta} \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{T}_i}(f_{\theta})$ 
7:   end for
8:   Update  $\theta \leftarrow \theta - \beta \nabla_{\theta} \sum_{\mathcal{T}_i \sim p(\mathcal{T})} \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{T}_i}(f_{\theta'_i})$ 
9: end while
```

Method

❖ Motivation: Focal Loss

- ❖ vast number of easy negatives overwhelms the object detector during training
- ❖ proposed to make the model focus on hard examples

$$\mathcal{L}_{FL}(p_t) = -(1 - p_t)^\gamma \log(p_t)$$

❖ TAFL: Task-based Adversarial Focal Loss

❖ I. Sample- \rightarrow Task:

- ❖ use cross entropy loss to represent focal loss

$$\mathcal{L}_{CE} = -\log(p_t)$$

$$\mathcal{L}_{FL} = (1 - \exp(-\mathcal{L}_{CE}))^\gamma \cdot \mathcal{L}_{CE}$$

- ❖ extract the modulating factor term

$$M_{FL} = (1 - \exp(-\mathcal{L}_{CE}))^\gamma$$

- ❖ applied to meta-learner? loss term represents sum of loss in a task rather than an example

Method

❖ II. Classification difficulty->Adversarial robustness:

- ❖ objective of white-box attacks \mathcal{A} :

$$\mathcal{A}(x) \rightarrow \max_{x_a: ||x_a - x|| \leq \epsilon} \mathcal{L}_{CE}(x_a)$$

- ❖ introduce difference between loss on clean and perturbed query data $\mathcal{L}_{AR}(\tau)$ to replace \mathcal{L}_{CE}

$$\mathcal{L}_{AR}(\tau) = \max \left\{ \mathcal{L}_{CE}(f_{\theta_\tau}, \mathcal{A}(x_q)) - \mathcal{L}_{CE}(f_{\theta_\tau}, x_q), \delta \right\}$$

- ❖ rewrite modulating factor term and construct meta update loss

$$M_{TAFL}(\tau) = (1 - \exp(-k\mathcal{L}_{AR}(\tau)))^\gamma$$

$$\mathcal{L}_{TAFL}(f_{\theta_\tau}, x_q) = M_{TAFL}(\tau) \cdot \mathcal{L}_{CE}(f_{\theta_\tau}, \mathcal{A}(x_q))$$

- ❖ such factors are not function of θ to be minimized during gradient descent optimization

Experiment Design & Results

❖ Experimental setup :

- ❖ datasets: Omniglot / MiniImageNet / CUB
- ❖ sample 100 batches of test tasks, calculated with 95% confidence intervals

❖ Robust accuracy:



- ❖ baselines: MAML, ADML, Adversarial Querying
- ❖ 3 attacks for test: PGD, MI-FGSM, C&W

Attack	Omniglot (5-way 1-shot)	MiniImageNet (5-way 1-shot)
PGD	$\epsilon = 0.1, step = 30$	$\epsilon = 0.01, step = 30$
MI-FGSM	$\epsilon = 0.1, step = 30$	$\epsilon = 0.01, step = 30$
C&W	$c = 10.0, step = 60$	$c = 1.0, step = 30$

Model/Attack	MiniImageNet dataset (5-way 1-shot)		
	PGD	MI-FGSM	C&W
MAML [7]	$0.42 \pm 0.06\%$	$0.01 \pm 0.01\%$	$14.38 \pm 0.36\%$
ADML [11]	$28.53 \pm 0.48\%$	$28.19 \pm 0.56\%$	$26.77 \pm 0.41\%$
AQ [12]	$28.20 \pm 0.48\%$	$27.94 \pm 0.54\%$	$26.82 \pm 0.42\%$
TAFL(ours)	$29.53 \pm 0.60\%$	$28.94 \pm 0.61\%$	$27.75 \pm 0.44\%$


Experiment Design & Results

- ❖ **Visualization on adversarial robustness loss (\mathcal{L}_{AR}):**
 - ❖ distribution of \mathcal{L}_{AR} over tasks when testing different defense methods
 - ❖ estimate the distribution via kernel density estimation(KDE) method
 - ❖ our method reduce the proportion of tasks with high \mathcal{L}_{AR}
- ❖ **Effects of different parameters:**
 - ❖ γ is a more sensitive parameter
 - ❖ robust accuracy increases first, and then reduces with γ increases



Conclusion

- ❖ proposed TAFL focus more on tasks which are hard to protect
- ❖ the proportion of adversarially fragile tasks are reduced via focal effect
- ❖ result in promotion of overall adversarial robustness



THANK YOU

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