
# Explain2Attack: Text Adversarial Attacks via Cross-Domain Interpretability

Mahmoud Hossam, Trung Le, He Zhao and Dinh Phung


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### Adversarial Examples Natural Language



### Generation Steps



### Generation Steps: Word Importance Ranking

- Words importance score  $I_{w_i}$  for word  $w_i$  is a function  $\Phi$  of the target model's probability P for the whole sentence excluding  $\mathbf{w}_i$ :  $I_{w_i} = \Phi(P(Y \mid X_{1:T}), P(Y \mid X_{1:T \setminus \{i\}}))$
- Is done word by word:



**Problem: Number of queries needed for word ranking = Length (Sentence)** 


### Generation Steps: Word Importance Ranking

- Challenges in black-box setting
  - Number of required queries

This restaurant is great and I will definitely come back

I wonder how I didn't know about this before, but this place is the best! - Needs a query for each word in a sentence

Raise suspicion towards attacking agent



### Generation Steps: Word Importance Ranking

 $I_{w_1}$ 

 $I_{w_2}$ 

 $I_T$ 


- Challenges in black-box setting
  - Number of required queries

This restaurant is great and I will definitely come back

[ ] restaurant is great and I will definitely come back

This [ ] is great and I will definitely come back

This restaurant is great and I will definitely come [ ]



### Interpretability

Employ Interpretability


Can learn important features from X

Objective: Maximize Mutual Information


$$\max_{\mathcal{E}} I\left(X_S; Y\right)$$

ullet Logits can be used as importance scores  $I_w$ 

#### **Interpretable Model**



### Explain2Attack




A) Substitute Domain




Legend



**Training** 



#### Candidate Adversarial Example $X_{adv}$



Target Sequence  $X_t$ 

#### **B) Target Domain**

### Results

#### Statistic of Used Datasets

- Explain2Attack reduced the average number of queries compared the baseline TextFooler.
- And achieves same or better attack rate, with higher Query

Efficiency (QE)

Dataset	Train	Test	Avg. Length				
IMDB	25K	25K	215				
MR	9K	1K	20				
Amazon MR	25K	25K	100				
Yelp	560K	38K	152				

#### After-Attack Accuracies, Queries and Query Efficiency

Classifier		BERT		WordCNN			WordLSTM			
Tar	Target Model		IMDB MR		MR	Amazon MR	IMDB	MR	Amazon MR	
	$Clean\_Acc.$	92.18	89.97	87.32	79.85	90.14	88.78	81.82	91.30	
	TextFooler (Jin et al., 2019)	11.88	13.59	0.60	1.50	$\bf 3.92$	0.04	2.06	2.15	
$Adv\_Acc. \downarrow$	(Substitute Data)	(Yelp)	$(Amazon\ MR)$	(Yelp)	(IMDB)		(Amazon MR)		(IMDB)	
	Explain2Attack (ours)	11.32	13.34	0.61	1.31	3.97	0.06	2.27	2.38	
Avg_Queries ↓	TextFooler	980.5	181.6	444	112.8	378.7	500.2	117.5	392.7	
Avg_Queries ↓	Explain2Attack	$\boldsymbol{873.5}$	184.07	404.5	108.7	349.4	440.5	114.2	369.3	
Query Efficiency	TextFooler	0.082	0.421	0.195	0.695	0.228	0.177	0.679	0.227	
(QE)	Explain2Attack	0.093	0.416	0.214	0.723	0.247	0.201	0.697	0.241	

### Results

Reduction in number of queries for dataset/model combinations




Table 5.3: Effect of Sentence Length on Number of Queries

Target Dataset			IMDB				Amazon MR		MR			
Classifier			CRT	CNN	LSTM	CNN	LSTM	BERT	CNN	LSTM		
Average Ser	tence Length			215		100		20				
Ava Oueries	TextFooler	980.5		444	500.2	378.7	392.7	112.8	117.5	181.6		
$ m Avg\_Queries \downarrow$	Explain2Attack	87	3.5	404.5	$\boldsymbol{440.5}$	349.4	369.3	108.7	114.2	184.07		
Difference			6.5	39.5	59.7	29.3	23.4	4.1	3.3	-3.0		

### Conclusion

- First framework to learn word importance in black-box setting.
- Reduces query cost and computational complexity.
- Achieves similar or better attack rates than state-of-the-art.
- Not affected by input length
  - Very efficient for long input sentences

## Thank You

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