Existing key-binding biometric cryptosystems, such as the Fuzzy Vault Scheme (FVS) and Fuzzy Commitment Scheme (FCS), employ Error Correcting Codes (ECC) to handle intra-user variations in biometric data. As a result, a trade-off exists between the key length and matching accuracy. Moreover, these systems are vulnerable to privacy leakage, i.e., it is trivial to recover the original biometric template given the secure sketch and its associated cryptographic key. In this work, we propose a novel key-binding biometric cryptosystem framework, referred to as Cancelable Biometrics Vault (CBV), to address the above two limitations. The CBV framework is inspired by the cryptographic principle of chaffing and winnowing. It utilizes the concept of cancelable biometrics (CB) to generate secure biometric templates, which in turn are used to encode bits in a cryptographic key. While the CBV framework is generic and does not rely on a specific biometric representation, it does assume the availability of a suitable (satisfying the requirements of accuracy preservation, non-invertibility, and non-linkability) CB scheme for the given representation. To demonstrate the usefulness of the proposed CBV framework, we implement this approach using an extended BioEncoding scheme, which is a CB scheme appropriate for bit strings such as iris-codes. Unlike the baseline BioEncoding scheme, the extended version proposed in this work fulfills all the three requirements of a CB construct. Experiments show that the decoding accuracy of the proposed CBV framework is comparable to the recognition accuracy of the underlying CB construct, namely, the extended BioEncoding scheme, regardless of the cryptographic key size.

A face identification system compares an unknown input probe image to a gallery of face images labeled with identities in order to determine the identity of the probe image. The result of identification is a ranked match list with the most similar gallery face image at the top (rank 1) and the least similar gallery face image at the bottom. In many systems, the top ranked gallery images may look very similar to the probe image as well as to each other and can sometimes result in the misidentification of the probe image. Such similar looking faces pertaining to different identities are referred to as lookalike faces. We hypothesize that a matcher specifically trained to disambiguate lookalike face images and combined with a regular face matcher may improve overall identification performance. This work proposes reranking the initial ranked match list using a disambiguator especially for lookalike face pairs. This work also evaluates schemes to select gallery images in the initial ranked match list that should be re-ranked. Experiments on the challenging TinyFace dataset shows that the proposed approach improves the closed-set identification accuracy of a state-of-the-art face matcher.

In this work, we propose a method to simultaneously perform (i) biometric recognition (\textit{i.e.}, identify the individual), and (ii) device recognition, (\textit{i.e.}, identify the device) from a single biometric image, say, a face image, using a one-shot schema. Such a joint recognition scheme can be useful in devices such as smartphones for enhancing security as well as privacy. We propose to automatically learn a joint representation that encapsulates both biometric-specific and sensor-specific features. We evaluate the proposed approach using iris, face and periocular images acquired using near-infrared iris sensors and smartphone cameras. Experiments conducted using 14,451 images from 13 sensors resulted in a rank-1 identification accuracy of upto 99.81\% and a verification accuracy of upto 100\% at a false match rate of 1\%.

In this paper, we first propose the use of Optical Coherence Tomography (OCT) imaging for the problem of iris presentation attack (PA) detection. Secondly, we assess its viability by comparing its performance with respect to traditional modalities, viz., near-infrared (NIR) and visible spectrum. OCT imaging provides a cross-sectional view of an eye, whereas NIR and visible spectrum imaging provide 2D iris textural information. Implementation is performed using three state-of-the-art deep architectures (VGG19, ResNet50 and DenseNet121) to differentiate between bonafide and PA samples for each of the three imaging modalities. Experiments are performed on a dataset of 2,169 bonafide, 177 Van Dyke eyes and 360 cosmetic contact images acquired using all three imaging modalities under intra-attack (known PAs) and cross-attack (unknown PAs) scenario. We observe promising results demonstrating OCT as a viable solution for iris PA detection.